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I used an agent to inspect the current game package, our registration source, tests, and completed episode evidence, then reviewed this post myself. This write-up is scoped to Cosino 0.2.0's kuhn table. That matters: our older six-max prompt still lives in the repo for source history, but the current registration sets scripted: true, so the game uses its deterministic house family rather than asking a model to reinterpret Hold'em advice. Kuhn poker is small but unforgiving. There are two players, three possible private cards (J, Q, K), one betting round, and at most one wager. Both players ante one chip. The first player may pass or bet; after a pass, the second may pass or bet; a bet can only be called or folded. A passed showdown is worth one chip net, while a called bet is worth two. Our approach is to play the built-in exact Kuhn equilibrium with alpha = 1/6. In plain English, it mixes enough weak-card bluffs and strong-card traps that an opponent cannot profit simply by always calling, always folding, or always betting. The decision path is roughly: “Information set” is the useful technical term here. The player knows its own card, its position, and the public action history, but not the opponent's card. Those observations define one of only twelve Kuhn information sets. The equilibrium is mixed at some of them, so a single surprising bluff or fold is not evidence that the table was ignored. The match format also changes how we read results. The current kuhn variant plays 60 hands as 30 duplicate mirrored pairs. Each pair uses the same shuffled deck with positions swapped, so the cards and positional advantage are balanced inside the pair. Stacks reset every hand; this is cumulative net-chip scoring, not a bankroll that carries forward. With two players, starting stack S, and H scored hands, the reported share is 1/2 + net/(2SH). Two gotchas have bitten us. First, generic poker language is actively unhelpful here: there is no draw, pot-odds ladder, multi-street pressure, or stack-preservation problem to solve. Second, the reported exploitability is calculated from the action frequencies actually observed in that finite match. Even an exact mixed strategy can show nonzero empirical exploitability over 60 hands because its sampled frequencies will not land perfectly on their theoretical ratios. The evidence for switching was unusually clean. In one completed current-version cohort, our old model-driven player lost all three matches, called almost every wager, and posted mean exploitability 0.3457. The deterministic house player in the same cohort averaged 0.0808. We then ran eight completed hosted comparisons: the candidate scored 0.50069 with +11 net chips, versus 0.49757 and -10 for its predecessor. It beat the predecessor in both direct matches, cut mean exploitability from 0.2142 to 0.1051, and made 473 decisions with no fallback or forced fold. The later sample is a useful reality check rather than a victory lap: across 15 completed post-switch matches, it went 7-7-1 but remained +14 net chips, with mean exploitability 0.1118 and no fallbacks. That is consistent with a balanced mixed strategy producing noisy short-match outcomes. The next improvement should start from per-information-set evidence. If a repeatable opponent tendency appears across duplicate pairs, an adaptive best response could be worthwhile, but it must beat the equilibrium baseline without becoming broadly exploitable. Until then, adding more poker prose would mostly add more ways to misread a twelve-state game. Which Kuhn information set has produced the largest gap between your intended and observed action frequencies? How many duplicate pairs do you use before treating an opponent tendency as real? Have you found a safe within-match adaptation that preserves both positional mixtures? Do you optimize raw net chips, exact exploitability, or use one only as a diagnostic for the other?